RIC-Scotland organised demonstration at Spanish Consulate on Sunday, 1st October
Speakers - Quim Arrufat, International
Coordinator for the Popular Unity Candidacy
Luke Stobart, London
journalist who has lived in Barcelona for 13 years
Facilitator - Pat Smith
Quim's up-to-the minute report from Barcelona and his answers to members
of the audience can be seen at:-
Luke prepared the following talk,
which was amended because of material already covered by Quim.
Elephant in room in coverage of terror attacks
Look at the world media's attention on Barcelona. There was
a bigger elephant in room than the undead one in Game of Thrones. It is possible that was not a coincidence that
attacks only took place in Catalan territory, just 6 weeks before a referendum
in Catalonia and that a previous linked terror atrocity took place just before
general elections and was seen to influence it, It was a Catalan government and
Catalan police force that rapidly managed to end the crisis (shooting dead
terrorist suspects with no attempt to take them alive – even where this was
possible). This revealed what one Spanish writer described as the existence of
an efficient Catalan state that was already de facto independent (actually we
could agree with this conclusion from a more critical perspective – by which
the demonstration of authoritarian violence proves the existence of a de facto
state. Perhaps that is too confusing a comment for so early in the talk…! Let’s
move on)
However, the wider response to the crisis was relatively civic
and peaceful – suggesting something else was underhand. I gave some examples in The Guardian but the best example was the large anti-terror
demonstration a week after the killings, which was inundated by
anti-Islamophobia and pro-peace placards. It featured mass whistling and
jeering of the King and President Rajoy – denounced for their economic and
military support for Gulf States identified as funding ISIS.
I don’t want to idealise Catalan society. Not everyone
reacted to the attacks calling for unity and criticising the establishment –
there were some attacks on mosques (as there were in rest of Spain). But overall
there was a much better reaction. Why? There is the Memory of 2004 train
bombings in Madrid, which the Aznar conservative government immediately blamed
on the Basque ETA.
An additional factor is to the left-wing atmosphere in
Barcelona and Catalonia – particularly – and also Spain. One of the reasons for that – among several (the others we can
return to) – is that there is a mass generally
progressive struggle for independence that is politicising, because it is
subject to legal threats, prohibitions, harassment and dirty war. According to
surveys, 72% of independistas described themselves as left wing (significantly
more than Catalan average – fairly left-wing) Let’s look at the movement in
more detail.
The national movement
Catalonia has a long proud history of attempting to
modernise society and political institutions against backwards and violent
central authorities that goes back to the MiddleAages.
From the late 19th Century Catalanism developed
as a response to the lack of modernisation and decline of a Spain ,It was initially
dominated by industrialists and other bourgeois political forces (and with a
strongly protectionist bent).
This was later radicalised– in a period of mass workers’ and
national agitation – around a more middle-class republican politics the
Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC). Autonomy (devolution. and republic. In 1934
under ERC President Companys briefly announced the creation of a Catalan state.
Again, it is important to avoid idealising the movement – like most nationalist
movements at the time leading advocates developed a racial worldview based on
innate difference with non-Catalans (similar to nationalist movement in the
Basque Country).
If the national movement had contradictions, which surfaced
in the Civil War when ERC took sides with the Communists and Spanish
Republicans against the revolutionaries – the CNT and POUM attempting far
reaching social change - it was still one that upset the most reactionary
sectors of Spanish society. Franco’s coup in 1936 was as much a response to the
fear of national fragmentation of Spain, as it was rising levels of
self-activity by workers and peasants. And both movements (like the current
pro-Catalan movement) were anti-monarchy. The right’s hatred of minority
nationalists – even those that did little to oppose (such as in the Basque
country) was such that it embraced the 1920s slogan ‘better a red Spain than a
broken Spain’.
After 1939 and the crushing of the Spanish Republic the
minority nations were stripped of autonomy, language and traditions repressed.
For decades only a single (Spanish) national culture was imposed through a
regime of fascist terror. A new movement developed led by barrister Jordi
Pujol. While this movement was socially far more limited than the workers and
neighbourhood movements that eventually undermined the possibility of Franco’s
regime continuing after his death, it allied with the broader left (for example
in monastery occupations and in formal CP-instigated pro-democracy platforms).
Gone was much of the essentialism of the early 20th Century. Pujol
defended a Catalonia that was for all who lived there was (even if he would
also make clear that he thought southerners were culturally inferior). Like Scottish nationalism, this was a clear
civic nationalism, something that has allowed (and continued to permit) the
movement to integrate large numbers of non-Catalans.
So how could we summarise the movement? Perhaps by having a
somewhat complex, long but broken history. Arguably it should be seen more as a
failure of the Spanish national project than a millenarian project. Some
nationalists – including pro-Catalan radicals – may not like me saying that.
But the question exists as to why – if historic Catalonia includes part of the
French as well as Spanish territory is there only a serious movement on the
Spanish side. (And a comparable unevenness can also be identified in the French
and Spanish Basque Country). Quite simply France created a successful nation
state. At least since the 19th century Spain only achieved national
unity through force.
The current struggle
The current tensions did not start with what is described as
the ‘sovereignty process’ in 2012. Rather they began in the early 2000s with
the hostility by the Aznar government towards the historic nationalisms
(particularly the radical Basque independence movement, which suffered
widespread repression). In 2003 a Catalan left-alliance led by a Socialist,
attempted to reform the Catalan statute to gain greater powers – fiscal,
immigration policy, cultural. This was approved in a referendum in the mid
2000s but then truncated first by the Socialist government, then congress. The
conservative opposition appealed to the Constitutional Court and fourteen
articles were deemed unconstitutional. It denied Catalonia having the legal
status of a nation. 1.5 million demonstrated in protest in Barcelona under the
slogan “We are a nation. We decide”
Between
2009-11 local pro-independence activists held local symbolic referenda. The key
thing was a grassroots movement. At this point the main impulse of those
protesting was the denial of their national status and the way that their
language culture continued to be treated as a threat and “problem”, e.g. in the
Spanish comedy film Siete Apellidos
Vascos (Eight Basque Surnames or Spanish Affair.) Sometimes this showed a
nastier prejudice. e.g. against Barcelona taxi drivers.
With the onset of the crisis another argument was added: the
economic case for independence. A strong wing of the pro-Catalan politics –
that represented by Pujol’s and later Mas’ Convergència – always mainly sought
greater economic advantage for Catalonian territory, institutions and
businesses (defending the interest of the Catalan bourgeoisie). The fundamental
argument is there is a fiscal transfer from and discrimination by Madrid - "Madrid ens roba" (Madrid robs us).
Now economic liberals argued that independence would put a stop to such
transfers and every Catalan would be 8% better off – an argument defended after
2012 by economic liberal pro-Catalan president Mas. A new “pragmatic” layer of
converts greatly widened support for independence.
Worth pausing here because the economic arguments are in my
view one key to understanding some of the misunderstandings over Catalanisme.
The economic case is not totally spurious. The state has invested less in
transport infrastructure, and non-toll motorways. There is a relative transfer
of revenue to the Spanish state's coffers from richer territories, which are
almost all in Catalan speaking territories and the Basque Country. The Spanish government has preferred to sell
energy utilities to foreign companies, rather than to Catalan banks – to avoid
concentrating too much economic influence in Catalonia. (My take on this is
that there is interest in rebalancing the economic power away from the areas
that industrialised first and developed strong local national identities: Basque
Country and Catalonia). Of course there are limits to this as economic
development is not only or mainly shaped by government policy.
But, and here there has to be a giant but, the main reason Catalonia makes a large net transfer to the
central state is that it is a relatively rich part of state. It’s transfers –
like those from other parts of the state – help investments – including in
welfare state provision – that aid more disadvantaged areas such as in the
South. Political hostility towards Catalan demands in Andalusia is not just a
product of Spanish nationalist propaganda. This area – with over 40%
unemployment – would likely see its tax burden increase and restrictions on
revenue.
Not all independentistas argue the economic case for
independence – CUP tends not to – and the expression “Espanya ens roba” is
pretty discredited in Catalonia. But the pro-independence movement has done
little to argue against this argument,
which is more reactionary than progressive and divisive. The idea that Catalans
are selfish is behind the willingness to accept the anti-independence narrative
that the independence movement is being naively manipulated by the Catalan
bourgeoisie.
Contradiction at the heart of the pro-sovereignty movement.
According to surveys economic reasons are the biggest motivations for
supporting independence amongst pragmatic converts): but only the main one for
30% of pro-independence supporters, followed by 26% having a feeling of not being
understood/will to self-govern, 24% wanting to make a better country and only
20% seeing as a question of identity.
Another reason why the pro-independence struggle exploded in
2012 was the wider social struggle. The Indignados movement – a Spain-wide
movement that began in Madrid – was not clearly linked with the national
movement. In Pl. Catalunya in Barcelona a vote on support for
self-determination was nearly lost! Mainstream pro-Catalan politicians
criticised the amount of Spanish being spoken in the squares. But the movement
– opposing austerity but also (more fundamentally) the poverty and corruption
of the political system – put the whole political establishment on the
defensive – particularly the pro-Catalan Convergencia i U, which as the governing
party in Catalonia had been one of the strongest agents and advocates of
austerity.
Some (including myself) were surprised when CiU turned to
supporting independence in the autumn of 2012. The mass pro-independence
protest of that year was key but perhaps also were the occupations, which left
CiU needing to cling on to its Catalan nationalism in order to survive
electorally. Developing out of the Indignados movement (as well as other
inspiring social movements such as la PAH (Defending the Right to Housing) there
emerged the view that the post-Franco political and institutional structure (or
“post-78 regime”) was at fault and needed a radical overhaul.
Activists in Catalonia responded creating a “constituent
process” campaign to build the new Catalan political framework in the interests
of the 99% (unfortunately this interesting iniciative has floundered since.
El Procès
There are 3 pro-Catalan forces (CiU – centre right, ERC
-centre left – but increasingly centre, CUP - anticapitalist)
The last five years have followed a different logic.
Politics has stayed on the street – spectacular yearly protests on the Diada (national
day of Catalonia) – but the engine of the Process has increasingly been in the
institutions and even politicians from the parties seen by the new movements as
least “representing us”.
Since 2012 there have been:-
·
An attempt
under CiU leader, Mas to hold referendum on 9th Nov 2014: banned.
CiU wished to cancel. CUP pushed for (effectively symbolic) referendum, Mas
joined call.
In
response the Spanish state has issued threats and attempts at repression and The
3 main politician ‘organisers’ have been fined 5 million euros (not a small
punishment!)
·
Plebiscitary
elections were held on September 2015. CiU and ERC Junts pel SÃ (Together for Yes). CUP resisted
pressure to join, aiming to widen pro-independence constiuency by defending
social change – something more important now ERC subordinating its political
strategy to right. Junts pel SÃ and CUP stood on platform of defending
unilateral declaration of independence if majority of votes were
pro-independence. They won largest vote, but not the majority. This
inconsistency was becase of Podemos’-Eurocommunist coalition which takes no
position).
* Junts pel SÃ did not have parliamentary
majority. In order to continue the Process it needed to ally with CUP. There
was s vitrolic campaign against CUP by whole of Junts pel SÃ, much of movement,
pro-independence media (including sexist trolling against Anna Gabriel, the
CUP's parliamentary spokesperson). Mas – the austerity knife wielder wad removed
from Assembly tie! Buck. The fate of the
country was in hands of 1 anti-capitalist. Furious humiliated Mas agreed to
abandon presidency but not without getting CUP neogtiatiors to sign an apology
and to agree to hold up Junts pel SÃ government under new president Puigdemont.
This was later agreed – in exchange for binding unilateral referendum. The
budget was not an austerity budget but it was not a decisive break with
neoliberalism either.
·
Were
the CUP right? My feeling was it was right to insist on the need to eliminate
Mas, but that other agreements are more problematic. In the short term it must
be acknowleged that this agreement won the holding of the coming referendum.
This was important as active and support for independence has been sliding
after years of a slow Process.
But
in the long term this may have been an own goal. From the Scottish referendum
to Corbyn and the early Podemos in Spain we have seen that when serious social
change is offered the social majority reacts positively. The strong vote for
Spanish centralism in the industrial belt is not just about the more varied
national origins of population. Surveys show that support for independence is
centred on middle classes and is weaker among migrant workers. It is also a
class response to a project that is still steered by bourgeois presidents.
Referendum
The referendum was always going to be contentious and lead
to conflict. Spain's governing party is a particularly conservative electoral
party with roots in Franco’s dictatorship. Its attitude to minority nations –
they don’t exist (as decided at its 2008 party congress – “Spain is every
Spaniard’s only historical and political reality …. Constitutional Spain … is a
single nation whose sovereignty corresponds only and exclusively to the Spanish
people”). Aznar’s reaction to the Madrid bombings was a case in point. I would
make the following comment on George Kerevan’s piece in The National. We should not think that Spain is simply an exception
when it comes to state backing for repression or threats: we should not forget
Bloody Sunday and some of the economic threats against Scots in the Indyref.
Catalonia punches above its weight. It is a major component
of the Spanish economy – as well as symbolically (Barcelona is perhaps better
known and respected internationally than Madrid). The failure of the Spanish
national project means there are nationalist movements from Galicia in the
North East to the Canaries off the African coast. The Basque Country,
particularly, watching Catalonia with interest. Furthermore there is no
historic union between nations. Catalonia’s statehood can only be understood as
a loss of a large part of the Spanish state.
70-80% of Catalans want a referendum. This should make mass
turnout possible, but the Spanish state has mobilised through all of its political,
media and other resources to question the validity of the referendum – which
those people radically against independence will boycott any way.
A disappointment has been the decision by Podemos and los
Comunes’ Catalan coalition not to recognise the referendum as binding, despite
not presenting any realistic alternative. Their argument is that only
pro-independence forces have called it (!) Barcelona mayor Ada Colau – the
recognised leader of the PAH housing movement – has said she will not endanger
public servants by instructing them to break the law. This means accepting the
1978 regime can decide upon legality; as well as being disappointing for a
mayor who gained fame doing illegal blockades to prevent evictions.
This could also damage the chances of a high turnout. None
of the forces that are against independence are recognising the referendum for
what it is - a flawed referendum but the only one possible. That will weaken the
participation the 30% of Catalans that want a referendum but who are not in
favour of independence. At the moment surveys showing that 50% turnout and
around 70% ‘yes’ vote suggest that the conflict over the referendum could
intensify after.
This could change because of a wave of authoritarian
responses to the referendum:
-
Spanish
police raiding printers and newspapers to sieze ballot papers
-
S Suspension
by highest Spanish court – the Constitutional Court – of referendum and law
preparing transition to new state structures
-
Spanish
paramilitary and national police detachments have been brought into the Catalan
territory
-
Public
prosecutor calling for criminal charges against all cabinet members
-
The
head of the Catalan police has been instructed to tell his officers to prevent
the voting (which he seems to have agreed to do)
-
Perhaps
most crazily, legal prohobition of a rally in Madrid in support of Catalans’
‘right to decide’ (organised by the Trotskyist Anticapitalistes)
And we can add to this dirty war in which Interior Minister
was recorded instructing a campaign by fraud office, police and media to find
dirt (imagined or real) against Catalan politicians.
Add to this usual staple of propaganda against movement.
Menacingly Rajoy has said this a coup similar to that attempted by pro-Franco
supporters. He has also said that he only needs 5 days to scrap Catalan autonomy
and bring in a state of exception. This could be preparing the ground for a
heavy and even violent police response.
Consensus among pro-independence seems to be that this is to
scare people away from voting but it may galvanise people to vote. It should
not be assumed that those that don’t support independence will not do so, if
they see society evolving towards a police state.
What is the reaction
in Spain outside Catalonia?
Unions from across the State have met to show solidarity and
examine the possibility of solidarity actions in the face of repression
(although these unions were mainly so-called ‘nationalist’ unions specific to
territories with minority identities)
Podemos leaders have joined many of the Spanish leftists in
denouncing flagrant democratic violations. (The party mixes a populist
patriotism with recognition of the multi-national nature of the Spanish state –
a small but significant break with political tradition)
There is strong support for the right to decide in the abstract
But there is also a lack of understanding of minority questions – something
compounded by the dominant left politics. The New-Labour type socialists are
hardly indistinguishable from the conservatives. Podemos has sometimes bravely
defended Catalan self-determination against the other Spanish parties and
media, but faced with the messy real exercise of such seems to have run scared
– like its allies in Barcelona Town Hall.
Many Catalans believe things will shift. Colau has said she
will vote, and in 2014 voted ‘leave’.
One last difficulty:
Europe?
Merkel has said she only recognised Spanish laws and the
constitution. The EU will be a further obstacle. As CUP’s Ferndández says,
anyone who thinks the EU will help Catalonia gain independence should remember
that years after a mass struggle Catalan is still not a recognised language of
the EU
The CUP could play an important role here: highly critical
of EU and in favour of break with euro.
With all these
difficulties should the movement give up?
One of the most pleasant surprises has been Catalan Podemos
leader, Albano Dante-FachÃn in Catalonia. He has taken a highly principled
position on the referendum. While insisting he will vote no, he has said the
referendum day should be turned into a new Indignados type protest for
democracy and we should stay on the street. This has gone down very badly with
the Podemos leadership, but it exactly the kind of action that could take break
the impasse and bring new social forces into the struggle.
Catalan friends say a lot could change before the referendum
– even the attitude of the non-independentista left – but it will take linking
the size of the national protests with the radicalness of the Squares to break
the impasse.
The questions and Luke's answers can
be seen at:-
It was agreed that RIC-Edinburgh should approach Catalans active
in Edinburgh and Scotland to organise a protest at the Spanish Consulate in
Edinburgh.
RIC-Edinburgh organised the protest outside the Spanish Consulate in North Castle Street on Monday, 25th September. About 150 people attended.
RIC-Scotland organised the protest outside the Spanish Consulate on Sunday 1st October to coincide with the referendum. About a 1000 people attended. See report at:-
